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Abstract
This article argues that the WTO entrenches an asymmetrical, non-reciprocal trading system
that benefits multi-national corporations especially, at the expense of industrial workers, farmers,
and a wide range of business enterprises. It argues that the WTO doesn’t deserve to survive in
its present, unbalanced, and unsustainable form, and that it is doubtful that its voting regime,
accumulated asymmetries, and overall rigidity can be overhauled. The author posits that bilateral
and regional trade bargaining will become increasingly important and that world market forces are
likely to bypass, and perhaps overwhelm, the WTO.
THE WTO: A TRAIN WRECK IN PROGRESS?
William A. Lovett*
The World Trade Organization' (or "WTO") grew out of (i)
U.S. Cold War trade policies, (ii) non-reciprocal trade liberaliza-
tion deals under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs'
("GATT") between 1947-1994, (iii) euphoria about the global
economy emerging with the collapse of Communism in 1989-
1991, and (iv) enthusiasm about European unification efforts
between 1989-1992. 3 Although the United States promoted the
Uruguay Round4 in 1986-1993 to level the playing field and
broaden free trade (in agriculture, finance, services, invest-
ments, and intellectual property), the rhetoric of the WTO cele-
bration distorts the real results and ignores troubling flaws in the
global trading regime.5
In fact, the WTO entrenches an asymmetrical, non-recipro-
* Joseph Merrick Jones Professor of Law and Economics, Tulane Law School.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, art. 1, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
3. This Essay evolved out of six previous trade studies: (1) STAFF REP. COMM. ON
BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
AND THE WORLD BAZAAR (William A. Lovett 1984); (2) WILLIAM A. LoVEr, WORLD
TRADE RIVALRY: TRADE EQUITY AND COMPETING INDUSTRIAL POLICIES (1987); (3) William
A. Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 1 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 135-89 (1993); (4) William A. Lovett, Current World Trade Agenda: GATT, Re-
gionalism, and Unresolved Asymmetry Problems, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001-2045 (1994)
[hereinafter Current WTO Agenda]; (5) William A. Lovett, World Trade Policies: Limits
on Economic Integration, in INTERNATIONAL MARKET CHANGE AND THE LAW (Jukka
Mjih6nen ed., 1996); and (6) WILLIAM A. LoVErr ET. AL, U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY,
THEORY, AND THE WTO (1999) [hereinafter TRADE POLICY].
A central theme is the crucial importance of asymmetries, unequal openness, and
differential subsidies. While many countries give lip service to "freer trade," in reality
the world is far from a level playing field or fully open. This asymmetry produces sub-
stantial trade imbalances and strains, with heavy net capital inflows to the United States
that cover large U.S. trade and current account deficits. U.S. banking and financial
interests claim they benefit, but how much longer will the rest of the world trust the
U.S. with large accumulations of foreign capital as a safe haven?
4. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
5. This Essay represents a sixth year review of the WTO Agreement. For a 1994
preview, see The World Trade Organization: Hearing Before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, 103rd Cong. (1994) [hereinafter Hearings].
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cal trading system that benefits multi-national corporations
("MNCs") especially. It also makes insecure the lives and pros-
pects of many industrial workers, farmers, and a wide range of
business enterprises. Many environmental interest groups also
complain that the WTO and GATT weaken the regulation of
businesses and encourage the relocation of industrial plants to
"irresponsible" countries which despoil their local environments.
All this, they believe, threatens widespread damage to our eco-
sphere. Furthermore, the WTO-Uruguay Round aggravates
some trading imbalances. In particular, the WTO-Uruguay
Round allowed substantially enlarged U.S. trade and current ac-
count deficits during the mid-late 1990s, and into 2000-2001.
Along with the trend toward more unrestricted capital flows,
cross-border investments, lending, and borrowing, the WTO-
Uruguay Round framework also facilitates "hot money" transfers,
unstable liquidity movements, and allows wider "panics" and
macro-economic instability in the global economy. Whether all
this remains sustainable is questionable.6
Sadly, the WTO's decision-making and voting regime is a
contradictory mess.7 United Nations ("U.N.") General Assem-
6. See supra, note 3. Particular attention should be paid to Trade Policy, supra note
3, at 3-218; see alsoJOHN CULBERTSON, THE TRADE THREAT (1989); SIR JAMES GOLDSMITH,
THE TRAP (1994); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT (1997); SAMUEL HUNT-
INGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1997); RoB-
ERTJEROME, WORLD TRADE AT THE CROSSROADS (1992). For more recent articles on this
topic see Chris Swann, Funding Fears add Currency to Doubts on $, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2000, at 14; Michael Phillips & Nicholas Kulish, Current Account Deficit Rose Last Period,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2000, at A2; Samuel Brittan, Watch The Dollar, Not the Euro, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at 19; Martin Wolf, The Lure of the American Way, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2000, at 19; and Stephen Roach, Preparefor a Hard Landing, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at
15.
7. See WTO Agreement art. IX (establishing WTO voting procedures). Article IX
states:
The WTO shall continue the practice of decision making by consensus ....
Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by con-
sensus, the matter shall be decided by voting .... [E]ach member of the
WTO shall have one vote .... Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless other-
wise provided ....
Id. Waivers and Interpretations require super-majorities of three fourths of the mem-
bers. Id. Accessions and Amendments-of a nature that would not affect rights and
obligations of members-require two-thirds of the members. Id. art. X, XII. This
means, for most matters, majority voting (one vote per country).
In recent "voting" for Director-General a political impasse developed. See Frances
Williams, Impasse in Search for WIFO Head, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1999, at 9; Elizabeth Olson,
U.S. and Europe at Impasse on New World Trade Chief, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 1999, at C6. This
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bly-style voting governs (one vote per nation, except the EU,
which receives fifteen). This guarantees heavy voting majorities
for United Nations Trade and Developing Countries
("UNCTAD") and developing countries and a working majority
for the EU and Lom6 Convention states'-former European
colonies-together. Nonetheless, the United States claims, with
doubtful WTO textual support, a GATT tradition of "consensus"
for important trade policy decisions. Fractious bickering fol-
lowed, particularly for the Director-General and other top WTO
leadership elections. The United States now finds itself fre-
quently opposed to large "majorities" of WTO members with the
EU remaining in the driver's seat (more often than not). Fur-
thermore, increasingly fractious conflicts between the United
States and EU over WTO disputes threaten a trade war among
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ("NATO") allies. Bitter con-
flicts include bananas, beef hormones, "higher-tech" farm prod-
ucts, commercial aircraft subsidies, export tax treatments, and e-
commerce. Many worry about an unraveling of free world and
NATO collaboration. 9
Unfortunately, we converted the relatively obscure GATT,
which was used for occasional, complex trade negotiations, with
consensus deal-making, into a continuing body, the new World
Trade Organization." ° This was a serious U.S. foreign policy
mess was solved by breaking the next WTO Director-General's term in half-with two
years for the New Zealander and two years for the Thailander.
The International Monetary Fund's ("IMF") weighted voting system is far superior
to the IWTO's United Nations ("U.N.") General Assembly (one Country/one vote) deci-
sion-making. See Trade Policy, supra note 3, at 173-82 tbl. 5.3 (describing IMF Executive
Directors and Voting Power).
8. African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community: Final
Act, Minutes, and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990) [herein-
after Lom6 IV].
9. For all eight General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") rounds, 1947-
1994, the U.S. played the leading role in shaping the post-World War II trading arrange-
ments among non-communist nations. For the best historical summaries, see ALFRED E.
ECKES JR., OPENING AMERICA'S MARKET: U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY SINCE 1776 (1995);
STEVE DRYDEN, TRADE WARRIORS: USTR AND THE AMERICAN CRUSADE FOR FREE TRADE
(1995). Yet, the recent Seattle (Millennium) WTO round of late 1999 broke up in
dissension (and riots by protesters). See World Trade: The Battle in Seattle, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 27, 1999, at 21-23; William Satire, The Clinton Round, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at
A29; see also The Trade Agenda: A Different, New World Order, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2000,
at 83-85; Lori's War, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 2000, at 28.
10. Sadly, when the U.S. transformed leisurely GATT negotiations (with consensus
decision-making) into a continuing body, the Americans put themselves under heavy,
regular pressure to meet the "needs" of other members (especially the EU and develop-
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blunder. Expectations of "continuing world trade governance"
were aroused. The United States greatly reduced and marginal-
ized its own influence in future trade negotiations. Why the
United States political leadership (Presidential and Congres-
sional) agreed to this arrangement is increasingly a "puzzle."
I. CONFLICTING OUTLOOKS ON FREER TRADE AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY
The WTO's logjam of conflicting interests comes into better
focus by appreciating the rival "freer trade" outlooks that com-
pete in modern World politics.' At first glance a broad consen-
sus seems to support freer trade in the post-Cold War era. But
which version of freer trade?12 On whose terms? With what
ing countries). Now, it is hard for the United States to insist upon defending their own
vital interests, and to limit excess U.S. trade deficits.
11. Most countries believe that trade policy should satisfy their own national inter-
ests, including industrial growth and development, productivity and competitiveness,
and a healthy balance of payments. But, it was mainly U.S. trade negotiators, in recent
years, that worried about "saving the system" of freer world trade, along with multina-
tional corporate interests (rather than "defending" U.S. national interests, industries,
jobs, growth, environmental concerns, and social cohesion).
12. (i) Adam Smith's Reciprocal Freer Trade developed out of the historical practice of
mercantilism and guild and feudal privileges. Smith urged individual liberty, constitu-
tional parliamentary governance, and reciprocity-based freer trade among nations. Tar-
iffs for retaliation and safeguarding, along with subsidies for infrastructure and the
merchant marine, are appropriate. (ii) Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List-National
Development Model accepts laissez faire within large countries (e.g., United States or Ger-
man Federation), but imposes broad protective tariffs to promote industries and catch-
ing up with leading nations. (iii) British Empire Freer Trade largely eliminated tariffs in
the U.K., but access to British colonies remained closed, for the most part, by informal
restrictions and commercial custom. (iv) Neo-Classical Free Trade economists idealized a
world of mutually open markets, investments, and technology flows that would interna-
tionalize laissez faire. (v) Socialist Internationalism tried to respond with the expropria-
tion of extensive industrial property in each nation to eliminate oppression of the work-
ing class, thus freeing the world for socialist and democratic fraternalism among na-
tions. (vi) Cobdendite and Wilsonian Freer Trade preached progressive politics with free
trade, social insurance and safeguards for workers and farmers, representative demo-
cratic institutions, and world peace among nations. (vii) United States Cold War Policies
created a free world alliance against communist oppression and backwardness. The
United States and OECD industrial allies opened themselves to Least Developed Coun-
tries ("LDCs") using tariffs, industrial promotion, foreign aid, and international invest-
ment under GATT 1947, the IMF, and World Bank auspices. (viii) United Nations Trade
and Developing Countries ("UNCTAD") and the Group of 77 Plus nations want more aid,
trade preferences, and special treatment for investments to foster the development pro-
cess with more equal sharing of prosperity. (ix) The Uruguay GATT Round and wIrO
Agreements of 1994 tried to broaden freer trade by reducing safeguard protections for
OECD nations, reduce tariffs somewhat for newly industrializing countries ("NIC")
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preferences? And what safeguards? The devil is always in the
details.13 Unfortunately, the world trading "system" has become
a disorderly mdlange of conflicting versions of freer trade with
substantial asymmetries and imbalances.1 4  The GATT 1994-
WTO agreements were clearly freer trade in aspiration, but the
outcome failed to resolve structural disagreements. 5 Instead,
the architects of the GATT 1994-WTO "accommodation" merely
NICs and LDCs, promote more reliable intellectual property and investor protection,
reduce agricultural protectionism somewhat, and create a new dispute settlement pro-
cess with fast track enforcement of GATT and WTO commitments. (x) Multinational
Corporations ("MNCs") are beneficiaries and instrumentalities of global trading and cap-
ital markets. They want freedom to deploy investment, production, and technology at
their convenience, subject to restrictions that share progress with developing nations.
Many workers, farmers, environmentalists, and companies that suffer dislocations and
losses, however, insist that MNC "capture" of the WTO, global financial institutions, and
world capital markets are unfair, unjustified, and should be corrected. Meanwhile,
many NICs and LDCs complain that the richer nations are still benefiting dispropor-
tionately. Worries about the risks and dislocations of financial crises, panics, and deval-
uation have spread to most emerging nations and the majority of NICs and LDCs.
13. Chart 1 represents 18 years of research, thought, teaching, and lecturing
abroad in 25 countries. See supra note 3. This chart was first used in a lecture in Denver
on May 8, 2000. See William A. Lovett, Address at the Korbel Center of International
Relations, University of Denver (May 8, 2000).
14. The international trade views of Adam Smith are of special importance, but
not widely appreciated today. While Smith argued for laissez faire and the "invisible
hand" as an efficiency machine for the domestic economy, he accepted four big limita-
tions on international trade: (i) retaliation and mitigation tariffs, (ii) protection for
national defense and security, (iii) navigation laws to promote the merchant marine
and commerce, and (iv) extensive public works (roads, canals, harbors, and water
works-now we extend this to infrastructure and technology promotion). See ADAM
SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 429-36, 414-44, 651-716 (Modern Library ed. 1937). Alex-
ander Hamilton, Friedrich List, and John Stuart Mill broadened this limitation to in-
clude "infant industries." Most developing counties and NICs are still devoted to this
industrial nurturing, even though they partially reduced tariffs in the Uruguay round.
15. For an outstanding collection of essays on modern trade policy, see THE ACAD-
EMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE U.S.
(Frank Macchirarola ed., 1990). In particular, see John Culbertson, Workable Trade Pol-
icy for Today's Economic and Political World, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE CHANGING
ROLE OF THE U.S. 151 (Frank Macchirarola ed., 1990); Rudiger Dornbusch, The Dollar
and Adjustment Options, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE U.S. 54
(Frank Macchirarola ed., 1990); Robert Kuttner, Managed Trade and Adjustment Options,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE CHANCING ROLE OF THE U.S. 37 (Frank Macchirarola ed.,
1990); Ray Marshall, Standards Trade Linked Labor, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE U.S. 67 (Frank Macchirarola ed., 1990). From their stand-
points, the GATT 1994-WVTO agreements were sadly lacking in balance, realism, and
sustainability. If U.S. trade negotiators had paid proper attention to their guidelines,
the Uruguay Round could have been a lot more successful, with more emphasis on
reciprocity, too. See Robert Went, Game, Set and Match for Mr. Ricardo?, 34 J. ECON.
ISSUES 655-73 (2000); Alan W. Wolf, America's Ability to Achieve Its Commercial Objectives
and the WO, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1013 (2000).
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kicked the ball down the road. In so doing we failed to make a
timely, overdue correction for unsustainable U.S. trade deficits,
which are quite dangerous for the United States and world econ-
omies.
Chart 1
Conflicting "Freer Trade" Outlooks
* ADAM SMITH'S FREER TRADE * NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(Reciprocity Oriented) FREER TRADE (With Development
Tariffs, e.g., Hamilton and
Friedrich List)
o BRITISH EMPIRE FREER TRADE
(With Restricted Foreign Access
to British Colonies)
" NEO-CLASSICAL FREER TRADE
(One World Model-Everyone
Supposedly Gains)
" COBDENITE, WILSONIAN FREER TRADE
(Free Trade, Democracy and World
Peace)
* U.S. COLD WAR FREER TRADE
(Led By U.S. and the Organisation
of for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD"), Preferences
for the Developing Nations Accepted
by U. S.)
" SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM
(Liberated from Class Oppression,
Fraternal Socialist Cooperation)
" UNCTAD - GROUP OF 77 PLUS
FREER TRADE (With Strong newly
industrializing countries ("NIC"),
Least Developed Countries ("LDC")
Preference)
" WTO MODEL FREER TRADE
(Strong LDC Preferences, With
Aspirations for Gradually More
Opening)
* MNC ORIENTED FREER TRADE
(Freedom for MNCs to Operate
Everywhere, Subject to Restrictions by
Developing Nations to Promote Their
Industrialization)
As President Clinton's Seattle WTO (Millennium) Round
collapsed in confusion, televised riots, and recriminations, the
disconnect between the WTO's rhetoric and reality became obvi-
ous. Clearly, trade policy "consensus" broke down within the
United States, between the United States and EU, and between
"rich" nations and most developing nations. Nonetheless, MNC-
oriented trade "experts" press for WTO negotiations to be re-
sumed. Why? The "bicycle theory"-employed in the 1980s and
early 1990s tojustify "free trade" and MNC control over the mul-
tilateral trade agenda, despite mistakes and weak compromises
in the Uruguay GATT round-has been recalled into service.
But this outworn, battered "bike" is not working anymore.
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Now the United States and EU are equals, and rather quarrel-
some rivals, for global economic leadership. Now we lack an ea-
ger hegemon like the United States in the earlier Reagan-Bush-
Clinton administrations (say 1985-1996). Most Asian nations (in-
cluding the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"),
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) are now unwill-
ing to allow further market-opening momentum. Latin America
and most Islamic states are less willing now to move toward
OECD-style market opening. Russia is a mess and grumpy.
Meanwhile, OPEC forces higher oil prices and exploits scarcity
in energy markets. Conflicts, violence, and terrorism in the Mid-
East are increasing. Africa pleads special poverty and a need for
greater aid, debt relief, market safeguards, and assured exports.
And, most fundamentally, the rosy glow of free market global
euphoria from the early-mid 1990s has faded by 2000-2001.16
II. HOW BAD A DEAL?
How bad a deal is the GATT 1994-WTO framework? Assess-
ments depend upon different outlooks. MNC interest groups
say, "Let's not rock the boat." MNCs feel comfortable with the
entrenchment and extension of a global economy that allows
MNCs the freedom to locate facilities, production, trade flows,
and profits as they please. MNC interests want to extend, if pos-
sible, but most of all "to protect" this favorable environment.
By contrast, in the OECD countries, organized labor, the
Greens, many farmers and manufacturers, and other globalist-
skeptical elements in advanced industrial democracies (Austra-
lia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand, the United States, etc.) are
not satisfied with the GATT 1994-WTO arrangements. In the
United States, the "anti-WTO, no more fast track" coalition is
still powerful. Only a strong and sustained U.S. stock market
16. A majority of countries may have seen in 1993-1994 a "new world order" (the
collapse of communism, a new confidence in freer markets, the spread of democratic
governance, and expanding European unification and other regional integrations). At
that stage, some saw a continuing, perhaps rapid, trend toward a fully open world mar-
ket. But by 2000, this vision no longer governed. Many crises in Asia and emerging
markets, coupled with extensive capital flight, disruptions, and devaluations, have made
the majority of nations more cautious. Even Europe is now less trusting of a global free
market, with widespread fear for the excesses of globalization. Most countries now want
more limited, better supervised openness and capital flows. This means a consolidation
of partial, incomplete openness. This does not require, however, any drastic return to
mercantilism. World markets are somewhat freer, but unevenly so.
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boom, or "bubble," between 1993-1999 kept the lid on greater
trade dissension in the United States. But when this bubble sags,
the dollar slides, and a slump takes over, global economy pro-
tests will increase in the U.S. very substantially.
In the EU there are widespread anxieties about the excesses
of globalization, its dislocations, and misgivings about European
integration. As a result, EU officials have been tougher in de-
fending their trade interests and maintaining their agricultural
and industrial supports. On the "euro," Europeans are ambiva-
lent, with many wanting a stronger currency. Others are con-
tent, because exports are promoted in part by the euro's fall
from US$1.17 to US$.85. Now the EU has earned a growing
trade surplus with the U.S. The WTO voting structure is not a
problem for Europe, because the EU has fifteen votes and a
large block of Lom6 Convention states still collaborate with the
EU on trade.
In Japan the government's trading policy preserves more
safeguard protections through marketing customs, language,
culture, and administrative guidance (in spite of the "formally"
low tariffs). Thus, the Japanese "protect" their big trade sur-
pluses. While globalist "strains" afflict some Japanese workers
and small businesses-and considerable strain resulted from the
1997-1998 Asian crises-so farJapan does not gripe about GATT
1994 and the WTO. Japan basically cut itself a good deal in
1994.
Among the NICs and LDCs throughout the rest of Africa,
Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Mid-East, and Russia,
the current global trade/financial environment is viewed as inse-
cure and not sufficiently favorable. Developing countries want
to cut back on safeguards to foreign investors and intellectual
property holders. These nations want to limit further trade
opening, increase safeguard relief, and prevent the financial cri-
ses and devaluations that undercut their gains from expanding
exports and manufacturing. But most NICs and LDCs are deter-
mined to keep the advantages of asymmetry in trade relations,
i.e., their accumulated prerogatives under GATT and the WTO.
From the standpoint of a healthy, balanced, and sustainable
global economy, the Uruguay Round, GATT 1994, and the WTO
deals were needlessly flawed. They were badly designed architec-
ture. What should have been constructed was more reciprocity-
2000]
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oriented trade. The deal should have eliminated large and
troubling U.S. trade and current account deficits from 1983-
1993; these trading deficits got even worse in recent years. Bet-
ter balanced trade, more equal economic growth, and mutually
shared prosperity on a healthier basis should have been the
goals.
Instead, the United States pressed too hard for a GATT
1994-WTO deal "regardless of the details." In fact, United States
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor promised a final GATT
1994 deal in the spring of 1993 for the fall of 1993. " This gave
up U.S. bargaining leverage to force a better GATT 1994 deal.
By contrast, the EU, France, andJapan bargained more skillfully.
To them, "No GATT deal was better than a bad deal." This
should have been the U.S. position, too. The global economy
was gradually recovering in 1992-1993. Many emerging nations
were moving voluntarily toward "market discipline." Investment
capital was flowing again into many developing nations. Most
OECD nations were prospering, along with Asian NICs and
many other countries. The years 1993-1994 were an ideal time
to move the global trading system toward better balanced reci-
procity and sustainable economic growth. And the debt-over-
load crisis of 1982-1990, which badly squeezed more than sixty
developing nations, was greatly eased by 1993. Many developing
countries were recovering when Communism collapsed in 1990-
1991.
Only limited modifications to GATT 1947 were needed.
That regime was a well-balanced framework which gave ample
room for increasing trade and foreign investment to all coun-
tries, but kept sensible industrial safeguards, unfair trade prac-
tice remedies, and balance of payments relief to limit excessive
or undesirable trade imbalances. 8 Sadly, the GATT 1994-WTO
17. See TRADE POLICY, supra note 3, at 8-11, 100-05, 148-58. In the crucial June 10,
1994, hearings before the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, United States Trade
Representative Michael Kantor amazingly asserted that "[i]t is only a theoretical possi-
bility that the U.S. would lose in any WTO dispute settlement proceeding." See Hear-
ings, supra note 5 (statement of Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative).
18. For a full analysis, see Current WTO Agenda, supra note 3; Hearings, supra
note 5; TRADE POLICY, supra note 3, at 136-82. Unfair trade practice remedies-coun-
tervailing duties against subsidies or dumping-and safeguard remedies were powerful
offsets to foreign industrial policies, unequal openness, and mercantilism. See Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm; Agreement on
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regime unwisely weakened U.S. industrial safeguards, unfair
practice remedies, and trade balance discipline. In an unbal-
anced U.S. industrial-trade policy, the financial sector received
an over-emphasis in the U.S. engagement with world markets.
U.S. manufacturing, research and development, and exports
needed greater stimulus and stewardship in the 1990s.
Instead, what was left of U.S. manufacturing in 1993 was en-
couraged simply to relocate into low wage nations. Manufactur-
ing in the United States slumped further, although the U.S. ser-
vice economy gradually recovered.19 Meanwhile, the EU moved
toward a new common currency, the euro (for eleven of the fif-
teen EU members), but the EU sensibly kept more of its safe-
guards, import restrictions, and subsidy systems intact. The EU
also emphasized bilateral outreach and export expansion into
other markets, including the Far East, Latin America, the Mid-
East, and South Asia. Thus, the EU was able to maintain overall
trade balance throughout the mid-late 1990s and into 2000-2001.
And yet, the U.S. economy managed to pick up momentum
with a fortuitous series of stimuli.2z U.S. tax increases and de-
fense cuts in 1993-1994 eased excessive budget deficits. Presi-
dent Bill Clinton's US$200,000,000,000 health care reform
failed, which saved U.S. federal budget discipline. The Federal
Reserve lowered interest rates for awhile as the budget moved
toward balance. Meanwhile, the collapse of Communism
brought greater optimism, investments, and growth to many
emerging markets. Interestingly, Republicans maintained con-
trol of Congress from 1994-2000. This brought more U.S.
budget discipline and improved U.S. business confidence. New
technologies helped enhance U.S. growth, too. In addition, a
demographic accident proved helpful. There were fewer depres-
Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/docse/legal_e/final-e.htm; GATT art. XII. These trade remedies were also
good tools for leverage in bilateral trade bargaining, and to enforce more effective
reciprocity.
19. For a careful review of job losses (and limited gains), see TRADE POLICY, supra
note 3, at 186-87. To the extent the United States gained somewhat in the short run,
this occurred mainly in the years 1997 to 1999, when the U.S. stock market was boom-
ing strongly (allowed by large and increased trade-current account deficits and heavy
net capital inflows). The Dow Jones Industrial Average went from 5743 in 1996, to
11,700 in fall 1999, while the NASDAQ went from 1165 in 1996, to 5048 in early 2000.
Id. at 167-69 tbl. 5.1, 5.2. These were extraordinary stock price surges.
20. For an up-to-date review, see WILLIAM A. LovETr, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS LAW 84-100, 428-31, 435-45 (5th ed. 2001).
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sion babies (people born 1930-1942), and they have been retir-
ing later. This turned U.S. social security accounts into a me-
dium-term surplus machine (from about 1998-2010). U.S. infla-
tion also stopped, U.S. corporate profits increased, and U.S.
economic expansion broadened.
Along the way, in 1994-1995, and even more in 1997-1998,
the Mexican, Asian, Russian, Brazilian, and other foreign cur-
rency crises and devaluations made the U.S. dollar, its stock mar-
kets, and debt markets even more attractive as a safe haven.
Ironically, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan's
worries about irrational exuberance, and consequent U.S. inter-
est rate increases in later 1998-1999, only seemed to enhance in-
vestor confidence.2' Thus, the attractiveness of U.S. government
and private debt instruments in the world marketplace only in-
creased between 1995-1999. Meanwhile, the new euro, launched
so hopefully at the end of 1998, gradually started to slide in
value-from an initial US$1.17 to US$.85 by the fall of 2000.
The EU also suffered economic unease in the mid-late 1990s.
The U.S. boom accelerated and was reinforced by increasingly
heavy foreign capital inflows into the United States (that covered
swelling U.S. trade and current account deficits). In this way the
global marketplace elected the U.S. stock market and the dollar
as the favored manifestations of strength and virtue (at least
from 1993-99). But how much longer can the United States
keep living beyond its means this way? Not much longer say
most wise, experienced observers.
Forecasts of U.S. economic growth and stock market wealth
divide into four camps: (1) Onward and upward at unusually
high growth rates say the most optimistic, with faith in the In-
ternet, faster growth, and the unique virtue of U.S. capitalism;
(2) A soft landing with slowed growth, but no recession, is the
hope of many, including Alan Greenspan and the Federal Re-
serve; (3) Unstable stagnation is the projection of other observers,
and the partial correction between the fall of 1999 and early
2001 (with the Dow Jones Industrial Average down 12% and
21. Id. See also Greenspan Lays Out His Cards, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2000, at 27, 29;
Samuel Brittan, Market Euphoria Cannot Last, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2000, at 11; Peronet
Despeignes, Cup That Runneth Over may be Poisoned Chalice, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2000, at
6; Richard Stevenson, Candidates Plans for Surplus Face Threat in Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2000, at Al; The Next Banking Crisis: Banks in Trouble, The Bigger They Are, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 28, 2000, at 65-68.
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NASDAQ down 50%) seems to confirm their view; and (4)
Crunch and slow recovery is the gloomier forecast from those insist-
ing that the U.S. stock market and the dollar are still substan-
tially over-valued, and that a significant U.S. recession is unavoid-
able. In this situation, the renewed strength of OPEC, rising oil
prices, and increased violence in the Mid-East, placed additional
strain on the U.S. and global economies.22
Global trade has become, at the same time, more fragile (at
least for the United States) since the GATT 1994-WTO agree-
ments. 2 3 Strangely, the booming U.S. economy, its surging stock
market, and high dollar allowed a temporary neglect for the nor-
mal requirements of current account discipline. Countries ex-
porting heavily into the U.S.-ASEAN, Canada, China, India, Ja-
pan, Mexico, and parts of Europe-did not seem to worry about
a lack of U.S. trade discipline and dollar devaluation. Why not?
By 2000 the United States was importing
US$1,000,000,000,000 annually into its US$10,000,000,000,000
economy. But the United States was exporting only
US$600,000,000,000 in goods annually. Heavy net capital in-
flows are needed to make up the difference, i.e., a trend of
chronic and large U.S. trade-current account deficits that got go-
ing in 1983-1987, eased some in 1989-1991, and got worse again
in recent years. By the end of 2000, the accumulated U.S. trade
deficits will be at least US$3,000,000,000,000, while the accumu-
lated U.S. current account deficits will be at least
US$2,600,000,000,000. 2 4 In 1982, the U.S. had a net creditor po-
22. Id. See also ROBERTJ. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000), for a powerful
warning on the dangers of stock market over-valuation and the vulnerability to panics
and recession. See Ed Crooks, Oil Price Increase Could Derail Growth Train, FIN. TIMES
SURV., Sept. 22, 2000, at I. The world scene at the close of 2000, with increased violence
in the mid-east and elsewhere, problems of terrorism, excessive partisanship, is also
disturbing. See ANTHONY LAKE, 6 NIGHTMARES: REAL THREATS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD
AND How AMERICA CAN MEET THEM (2000). In this context, the U.S. election-political
crisis of November, 2000-was disturbing, with significantly negative potential impacts.
23. Surging U.S. imports in the later 1990s and 2000 depended upon a strong U.S.
dollar, which helped attract heavier inflows of foreign capital. But this also limited U.S.
export growth and aggravated the U.S. trade-current account deficits. Even back in
early 1998, economists were warning that excessive U.S. external deficits could not last
much longer. See Gene Koretz, Is the Trade Gap A Ticking Bomb?, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb.
23, 1998.
24. Between 1983 and 1997 U.S. trade deficits totaled at least
US$2,000,000,000,000, with current account deficits at least US$1,600,000,000,000. See
Trade Policy, supra note 3, at 14-43 tbl. 1.1-1.2. Between 1998 and 2000 U.S. trade and
current account deficits surged further with at least another US$1,000,000,000,000 of
2000]
422 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:410
sition of nearly US$400,000,000,000; by the end of 2000, U.S. net
external debts would be about US$2,100,000,000,000, a net
swing of about US$2,500,000,000,000. 25
The annual external debt service burden for the United
States is about US$110,000,000,000 in 2000, or roughly five per-
cent on the U.S. net external debt of US$2,100,000,000,000.
And yet, in 2000, the rest of the world still poured in nearly
US$400,000,000,000 in net capital flows into the U.S. stock mar-
kets and the purchase of U.S. government and private debt in-
struments (at significantly higher interest rates than the euro
area and much higher rates than Japan). Only the U.S. stock
market boom and higher interest rates explained this temporary
anomaly. Yet by the end of 1999, U.S. stock markets (many be-
lieve) had peaked and were falling back somewhat thereafter in
2000.26
In this situation, when confidence in the U.S. stock markets
and the dollar's value is shaken, the slumping dollar and falling
stock market will reinforce each other. Substantial paper wealth
in the United States and abroad could be destroyed, at least tem-
porarily. The United States will be forced to cut excess imports
trade deficits and US$900,000,000,000 of current account deficits. In addition, bilateral
and regional trade imbalances "got worse" with China, Europe, Japan, and the NICs.
See Michael Phillips, Trade Gap Widened by 15 % in September, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2000,
at A2, A13. Compare id., and TRADE POLICY, supra note 3, at 18-43 tbl. 1.2. In January
2001, the Economist estimated the U. S. trade deficit as US$435,000,000,000 and the U.S.
current account deficit as US$416,000,000,000 (for the year up to November, 2000). See
ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2001, at 107.
25. For a careful collection of relevant estimates on the net debtor (formerly credi-
tor) position of the United States, see TRADE POLICY, supra note 3, at 184 n.7. By the
end of 1997, we estimated the net U.S. debtor position at somewhere between
US$1,250,000,000,000 to US$1,500,000,000,000 (or 15-17% of U.S. GNP). With large
U.S. current account deficits of at least US$900,000,000,000 between 1998 and 2000,
the net U.S. debtor position should be roughly US$2,000,000,000,000 to
US$2,200,000,000,000 at the end of year 2000, or 20-22% of the US$10,000,000,000,000
U.S. GNP at that time. Prospects for continued foreign tolerance of these extremely
large U.S. net debt obligations are questionable. See, e.g., Quentin Peel, Get Ready for a
Bumpy Ride, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at 17 (noting the international financial market
reactions to the U.S. presidential elections crisis of 2000).
26. Peak values in late 1999-early 2000 for the Dow Jones Industrial Average
("DJIA") and NASDAQ Composite were 11,722 and 5048, respectively. Within the last
13 months the Dow Jones and NASDAQ had sagged to lows of 9796 and 2350, respec-
tively. See generally WALL ST.J., Nov. 14, 2000, at CI; WALL ST.J.Jan 29, 2001, at Cl. By
year end 2000 the Dow Jones was 10786 and the NASDAQ 2470. E.S. Browning, One
Day Rallies Aren't Always a Sign of Pep: History Suggests Nasdaq Losses Aren't Over Yet, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 2, 2001, at C1.
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from abroad (painful but unavoidable) and/or expand U.S. ex-
ports greatly (hard to achieve quickly). When the United States
must cut imports heavily by devaluation or import restrictions,
this will hurt U.S. trading partners. The WTO will become a
bloodier battlefield. How can such repercussions be avoided?
Unfortunately, pressures for better U.S. trade and current ac-
count "discipline," i.e., "living within our means," cannot be put
off much longer.
III. CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE WTO
Unfortunately, the WTO as presently constituted, with U.N.
General Assembly-type voting (and the EU's fifteen votes), has
no capacity for orchestrating an easy transition (over a few years)
to eliminate the large U.S. "structural" trade and current ac-
count deficits. Agendas proposed by the EU, NICs, and LDCs
for the Seattle WTO (Millenium) Round sought further weaken-
ing of U.S. safeguard relief and unfair trade practice remedies.
Thus, U.S. import discipline would be crippled. Meanwhile,
many developing countries want to weaken investment and intel-
lectual property protections. All this makes it harder for the
United States to cover its current account deficits with invest-
ment or royalty earnings. This kind of rigidity prevents the
WTO from undertaking any U.S. relief on a multilateral basis.2 7
Instead, the United States probably will have to cope with its
disruptive trade adjustment problems on an ad hoc, bilateral
emergency basis. 28 A major U.S. stock slump combined with a
27. The lack of "flex" (not wanting to rapidly increase imports from the U.S. into
their markets) among most other countries is simply a logical result of the established
world trade-finance "system." They must avoid significant trade-current account deficits
or their currencies will decline substantially with devaluation, with disruptive and dam-
aging income, confidence, and banking effects. Only the current world reserve cur-
rency nation, the U.S. and its dollar, enjoy for awhile, apparent immunity from these
trade-current account disciplines. How much longer?
28. As multilateral trade bargaining stalled out with conflicts and contradiction, a
strong trend toward bilateral and regional trade deals is in the works. See e.g., Guy
dejonquieres & Gillian Tett, International Economy: Japan Aims for S. Korea Trade Deal,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at 6; Sheila McNulty, Singapore-NZ Trade Pact Sparks Fears Over
WTO Authority, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at 10; Calvin Sims, A Turning Point for Pacific
Group, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 20000, at A12; Nicol Degli Innocenti et al., Middle East &
Africa: Italy and S. Africa in Trade Plan, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at 13; Guy de Jon-
quieres, Next WFO Chief: Supachai Urges Japan and EU to Reduce Trade Round Demands,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at 18; Takatoshi Ito, Asian Countries Must Stand Together, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at 19; Guy de Jonquieres, Asian Ambition, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28,
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substantial dollar devaluation will create great internal stresses-
both economic and political-within the U.S. Meanwhile "al-
lied" confidence in the United States would be weakened. This
greatly complicates helpful responses by the EU, Japan, LDCs,
NICs, and the emerging nations.
The standard remedy of the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") for countries suffering a currency, trade imbalance, and
import crisis is to advise them "to live within their means." The
normal prescription is to devalue the currency, reduce imports,
and increase exports over time.29 With so many countries heav-
ily dependent on exports to the United States (including
ASEAN, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, Mexico, South
Korea, and others) these "normal" disciplines will be resisted.
When the British pound faltered and floundered in the devalua-
tions of 1949 and 1967, the then-predominant U.S. economy en-
joyed the strongest reserve currency (the U.S. dollar) in the
world. Is the EU's euro now strong enough to provide a compa-
rable reserve currency to take the U.S. dollar's place? Not right
away, say many experts, and perhaps not for some additional
years. All this means that we face a disruptive threat to global
finance and trade, with major domino effect potential. Could a
suitable multilateral currency (like the special drawing rights
("S.D.R.")) be expanded quickly enough in a major U.S. stock
market/dollar decline crisis? Can a broad global slump be
avoided? We may be forced into finding out the hard way.
In retrospect, it would have been wiser for the U.S. and
other countries to settle for a modest Uruguay Round outcome.
2000, at 14; Andre Meyer, Discrimination Disguised as Free Trade, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000,
at 19; see also, TRADE POLICY, supra note 3, at 139-82 (urging the need for more coherent
and effective trade policy, with more emphasis on bilateral and regional relationships).
For a thoughtful forecast of problems facing the WTO before the recent Battle in Seat-
tle (over the proposed Millennium WTO Round), see Guy de Jonquieres, System
Threatened by Its Own Success, FIN. TIMES SURV.: WORLD TRADE, Nov. 29, 1999, at I. See
also Andrew Revkin Odd Culprits in Collapse of Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000,
Dl, 2; James Glassman, Forget Kyoto, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2000, at A26.
29. Even though many favor some easing of IMF disciplines and selective debt relief
for the poorest (and often overloaded with debt) countries, the IMF has only limited
capitalization and borrowing capacity. Thus, with the U.S. net foreign debt around
US$2,100,000,000,000, no IMF bailout can be orchestrated to prop up the U.S. dollar's
value. When confidence in the dollar sags, and other currencies become better values,
the dollar will fall substantially in value, along with foreign confidence in U.S. securities
and debt instruments. For recent IMF developments see Alan Beattie, Reform, Yes, But
Easy Does It, Says IMF Chief FIN. TIMES SURV., Sept. 22, 2000, at 17.
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A renewal of GATT 1947, limited tariff reductions by stronger
NICs, aspirational agreements to improve intellectual property
and investment safeguards, and modest reductions in agricul-
tural subsidies were enough to reassure global markets in the
early 1990s and to safeguard MNC interests. (No more was really
achievable.) But in striving for "too much"-an unrealistic "pro-
gress" toward world federal governance in the WTO, which crip-
pled U.S. trade flexibility-the Uruguay GATT 1994-WTO deal
created a fragile structure that could not be sustained. That was
really dumb.
GATT 1947, with its primary reliance on national states and
normal balance of payments discipline, was a better, more dura-
ble framework for essential U.S. and trading partner adjust-
ments ° If the United States had retained stronger safeguard
and unfair trade practice remedies, well-established under GATT
1947, the U.S. could have reduced imports directly and with less
stress upon trade partners. In fact, without GATT 1994 and
WTO distortions, the U.S. trade and current account deficits of
1983-2001 probably would have been corrected by the mid-
1990s, years earlier, with less disruption and political backlash.
Stupidly, the architects of the GATT 1994-WTO fashioned a one-
way straightjacket on the U.S. trade-finance flows. Why was this
blunder made? I suspect because the United States seemed to
be the "sole superpower" in 1992-1993, during the immediate
Gulf War aftermath. This was the geo-political predicate for an
unbalanced, unsound, and unsustainable trade regime in the
GATT 1994-WTO deal. The United States saw itself as all-power-
ful, and, for awhile, the other nations largely deferred. Wall
Street was enthusiastic, too. U.S. investment bankers saw them-
30. When GATT was created in 1947, leading economists had been greatly influ-
enced by the Great Depression, extended troubles and unemployment in the 1930s,
and the destruction and strains of World War II, along with major dislocations and
inflation in the early post-war recovery. Ample "flex" with extensive safeguard relief,
unfair trade practice remedies, quotas to protect farmers, and opportunities for indus-
trial nurturing were taken for granted. When countries suffered balance of payments
difficulties ("living beyond their means"), sensible adjustment measures, fiscal disci-
pline, and use of appropriate "flex" was the best way to solve these problems. By con-
trast, the present WTO, with its badly unbalanced voting, is simply incapable of solving
this major world problem of chronic, excessive, and unsustainable U.S. trade-current
account deficits. Rather the present GATT 1994-WTO gets in the way of responsible,
necessary trade adjustment measures. See, e.g., Bruce Stokes, The WJ1O Did Not Deliver,
31 NAT'LJ., Issue 50, Dec. 11, 1999, at I; see also Elizabeth Olson, Europe Rejects Compro-
mising With Europe Over Tax Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000 at WI.
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selves as big winners in the new post-Cold War economy. They
saw themselves as the hub and heroes of global commerce. Ah
well, that was then, this is now.
Will the WTO survive? It doesn't deserve to survive in its
present, unbalanced, and unsustainable form. Can its voting re-
gime, accumulated asymmetries, and overall rigidity be over-
hauled? That's doubtful. In any event, bilateral and regional
trade bargaining will become increasingly important. In fact,
this is already happening. World market forces are likely to by-
pass, and perhaps overwhelm, the WTO. So be it.
Sic transit gloria mundi.
